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Public Regulation Evolution of Local Public Goods in the Housing Economy (on the Example of the Major Renovation of Apartment Buildings in Russia)

Public Regulation Evolution of Local Public Goods in the Housing Economy (on the Example of the Major Renovation of Apartment Buildings in Russia)

Journal of Economic Regulation, , Vol. 11 (no. 4),

Residents of an apartment building become participants in situations of local public goods associated with the maintenance and use of common property, including major renovation of common property in the house. The solution of the social dilemmas arising in this case is possible both through the intervention of a third party – the state, and through the self-organization of the participants. The article attempts to trace the evolution of government intervention in the production of local public goods in the housing economy in Russia and to identify the prospects for the further development of government regulation in the field of major renovation of apartment buildings. The empirical basis of the study is the regulatory legal acts of the Russian Federation that regulate the management of common property in the housing sector since the 1990s. so far, forecasting and analytical documents of the federal and regional level, the activities of state institutions in this area. It was revealed that the declared guidelines of the state housing policy for the development of self-organization of homeowners in apartment buildings did not receive the necessary incentives for real implementation at different time stages. The modern highly centralized system of organizing major renovation of apartment buildings in Russia turned out to be its logical consequence, generating significant financial and material flows of private resources under the direct control and management of the state through a system of regional major renovation funds.


Keywords: local public goods; housing economy; apartment buildings; major renovation; state regulation; capital repair fund; regional operator; self-organization; special purpose account; Rostov region

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