Koryttsev Maxim, A.
Doctor of Economics (DSc), Professor of the Department “Economic Theory”, South Federal University, Rostov-on-Don

Journal of Institutional studies, 2014, Vol. 6 (no.4),

p. 22-31

In the paper, it is analyzed scrutiny of ethical norms problems (i.e. trust) in context of market behavior researches and methodological problems of several modern theories of economics (neoclassical economics, neoaustrian economics, NIET (The New Institutional economic theory etc.). It is analyzed the problem of value-neutrality limitations in market behavior on the strength of ethical positions of parties to contracts. It is actualized by contradiction between conscientious and opportunistic motives and actions in different period too (short or long) and information asymmetry. It means the necessary in complex ethic-economic approach for the analysis.

Rozmainsky Ivan, V.
Candidate of Economic Sciences (PhD), Associate Professor, NRU HSE, Saint-Petersburg

Lozhnikova Anna, V.
Doctor of Economics (DSc), Professor, Tomsk State University, Tomsk

Journal of Institutional studies, 2014, Vol. 6 (no.4),

p. 32-50

The paper is the extended critique of Kornai’s «theory of propensity to innovate» and contains hypothesis explaining why the Post-Soviet Russian economic system is non-innovative. Authors show that proposed by Kornai opposition «innovative capitalism/non-innovative socialism» is far-fetched. Contrary to Kornai, we can find innovative achievements in the Soviet socialist system as well as in the mixed capitalist systems with elements of socialism, in particular, with (indicative) centralized planning (China, India). Just the reverse, emerged in contemporary Russia economic system of «family-clannish capitalism» discourages agents’ incentives to the account of their decisions’ longterm consequences. The Russian households and firms underestimate their future and suffer from «investor myopia». Acted as the opponents to Kornai and based on the principle of historicism the authors emphasize the problem of specific place of Russia in the international division of scientific labor. They suppose that benefits from cooperation in the development activity should offset cost of specialization in the research work. The main ideas of the paper are confirmed by the large quantity of empirical stuff.

Volchik Vyacheslav, V.
Doctor of Economics (DSc), Professor, Head of the Department “Economic Theory ”, Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don

Krivosheeva-Medyantseva Daria, D.
Bachelor in Economics, Master Student, Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don

Journal of Institutional studies, 2014, Vol. 6 (no. 4),

p. 51-64

The Russian national innovation system is addressed in the context of various effects of a changing institutional environment and other factors that determine qualitative characteristics of economic development. High rates of educational attainment, stringent and focused innovation policy and qualitative institutions are assumed as key enablers for the innovative development of a country. National peculiarities of the financing of higher education and innovations have been examined in the paper. Much attention has been paid to the issues associated with commercialization of publicly funded research and development. The process of technology transfer and knowledge spillover is analyzed in the context of the Russian specific institutional environment. It is assumed that specific institutional characteristics of a country determine the conditions of functioning for those going concerns that operate in the realms of national science, education and innovations. Moreover, the extent to which these institutions are complementary to existent inner and international institutions and mechanisms of regulation will determine the opportunities for prosperity of a country or, on the contrary, it can lead to inefficiency of a national innovation system.

Dzagurova Nataliya, B.
Candidate of Economic Sciences (PhD), Associate Professor, National Research University - Higher School of Economics, Moscow

Agamirova Maria, E.
Assistant, National Research University - Higher School of Economics, Moscow

Journal of Institutional studies, 2014, Vol. 6 (no.4),

p. 65-76

Since mid-seventies the «hold-up» problem caused the underinvestment in specific assets has been remaining a key issue in neo-institutional economics. The traditional theoretical analysis of «hold-up» problem was based on consideration of so-called «selfish» relation- specific investments. Another type of relation-specific investments called «cooperative» investments (or cross investments) was nearly absent in economic analysis up to the very end of the twentieth century despite of the fact that such investments are widespread.

The distinction between selfish and cooperative relation-specific investments introduced in (Che and Hausch, 1999) based on the direction of specific investments effects in the internal trade (i.e. trade between main partners). The paper proposes an alternative approach to the classification of relation-specific investments, which is relied on the directions of these effects in the external trade (i.e. trade with alternative partners). This approach can be fruitful not only for theoretical modelling, but also for the antitrust regulation.

Malkina Marina Yurievna
Doctor of Economics (DSc), Professor, Head of the Centre of Macroeconomics and Microeconomics, Lobachevsky State University of Nizhni Novgorod, Nizhni Novgorod

Journal of Institutional studies, 2014, Vol. 6 (no.4),

p. 77-97

This paper develops the ideas and sometimes argues with the previously published research by I. V. Rozmainsky, who raised an important problem of declining the quality of goods and services in the course of «the capitalism development». The purpose of the paper is identifying the institutional foundations of the goods quality in market economy in general, and in the modern institutional environment of the Russian economy in particular. Neoinstitutionalism is chosen as research methodology. The hypothesis of this study states that the development of a modern market economy is accompanied by changes in the goods’ properties structure, i.e. by the improvement of certain goods’ qualities while other deteriorate. Dynamics of the goods’ quality structure is explained by changes in consumer behavior (spreading the ideology of consumerism, glamor capitalism, preference of functionality to durability, etc.), and by the development of organizational market structures (the dominance of multinational corporations and large retail chains). Both the general global and local competition tendencies and specific institutional backgrounds for the choice of the dominant competitive strategies do influence the quality. Supporting the idea of I. V. Rozmainsky that the accumulation of the power allows the producers to overcome the uncertainty, but leads to decline in the goods and services quality, the paper discusses some of the reasons for the growing uncertainty. It argues that one of the most significant reasons of it is the increase in the share of credence and experience goods in the consumption basket, as well as the acquisition of inspection goods the certain properties of credence goods. Increasing uncertainty contributes to spreading the adverse selection as a general pattern of monopolistic competition market. The problem of quality becomes complex in sophisticated technical systems, where all the elements are highly correlated, and the possible externalities are great. The author considers the government and the market regulation of quality as an imperfect alternatives, the effectiveness of both depends on the institutional environment and on the developed institutional mechanisms that ensure quality. The standardization, certification and consumer protection, being the three main institutions of government quality management, are analyzed in evolution in Russia, and the contradictions of their modern development are revealed. It is concluded that the quality should be maintained through formation of the hierarchy of complementary institutions, where the basic (constitutional) institutions plays the key role and serve as foundation for other institutional superstructures.

Skorobogatov Alexander, S.
Candidate of Economic Sciences (PhD), Professor, National Research University - Higher School of Economics, St. Petersburg

Journal of Institutional studies, 2014, Vol. 6 (no.4),

p. 98-115

Paper discusses the evolutionary game theory applied to the analysis of the social interaction dynamics under presence of the arbitrary start dependence. General setup of the game model with n players and n strategies is presented. Differences between the best reply related adaptive mechanisms with alternative adaptive mechanisms, including the natural selection, are examined. When it comes to the incentives problem, there are set forth conditions under which the final convention depends on the initial strategy distribution. The number experiment results are presented. For the coordination problem, varieties of the initial conditions are presented that determine asymptotic game dynamics.

Barbashin Maksim, YU.
Doctor of Social Sciences (PhD), Head of Sector in the Southern Russian Branch of the Institute of Sociology of RAS, Institute of Sociology of RAS, Rostov-on-Don

Journal of Institutional studies, 2014, Vol. 6 (no.4),

p. 116-136

In the paper the optimal institutional strategies of social agents in game uncertainty and in models of matching and marriage are analyzed. The author thinks that game theory analyzes “inner” rationality of individual interactions. Game theory aggregates a lot of social interactions to some choices and analyzes uncertainty of behavioral variants as understandable and stable pattern of regular interactions. The author comes to the conclusions that the institutional analysis of game situations is necessary for finding out key social and cognitive challenges with which social agents face in everyday life. The identity construction helps social agents to find solutions in social dilemmas. The analysis of game behavior should include studies of identity space.

Utenov Gimiran, G.
Student, Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, Moscow

Journal of Institutional studies, 2014, Vol. 6 (no.4),

p. 137-147

The role of the Central Bank of Russia at the present stage of development of our country is discussed in the paper. The author investigates the question whether the Bank of Russia can act as a megaregulator. The author analyzes whether the central bank acts as a key regulator in the financial sector or its functions should be limited by the banking sector. The world experience of a megaregulator model is considered in order to identify the main advantages and disadvantages of this model with reference to Russia. On the basis of this analysis, the author came to conclusion that the model of a mega-regulator on behalf of the Central Bank of Russia cannot contribute to the effective development of the Russian financial system. Based on the characteristics of the banking sector at the present stage of development the main directions of its regulation by the Bank of Russia are highlighted, including a special policy of regulation and supervision of banks with state participation in the capital and a new model of regulation of mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector.

Volchik Vyacheslav, V.
Doctor of Economics (DSc), Professor, Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don

Journal of Institutional studies, 2014, Vol. 6 (no. 4),

p. 148-154

Review devoted to the analysis of the monograph "Olympic Games Economics", prepared by R. M. Nureyev and E. V. Markin. The experience of studying economic issues of sport and the Olympic Games in the foreign and domestic literature is analyzed. A description of all monograph’s chapters and its detailed analysis is done. In the review the main stages of the international Olympic movement financing are described, as well as the diversification of funding sources of the Olympics. There is a notion of the Olympic business cycle in the review, its unity and differences with Zhuglar economic cycles are shown. Olympic business cycle is considered as a unity of economic and political activity.

Cost-benefit analysis on the time-different stages of the business cycle of the Olympic is given and the main control model and financing of the Olympic Games are examined. Particular attention is paid to the successes and failures of the Olympic Winter Games. In this context the analysis of the first socio-economic results of the XXII Olympic winter- these Games 2014 in Sochi is done.

Identified the strengths and weaknesses of the monograph, both in terms of material used, and possibility of its use in the educational process.

Yerznkyan Bagrat, H.
Doctor of Economics (DSc), Professor, Head of Laboratory of the Economic Development Strategy, Central Economic Mathematical Institute of RAS

Journal of Institutional studies, 2013, Vol. 5 (no. 4),

p. 58-77

The author considers the institutional characteristics of market transactions and nonmarket interactions as complementary alternative forms of organization of social and economic activities. A distinction is made between the types of economic agents: some of them are prone to transactions, while others to the interaction. The institutional system is capable of individual tendencies to strengthen or weaken. In general, the selection of the market or non-market mode of action is not predetermined: agents are free to choose the most appropriate in a particular situation type of their action. Features of transactions and interactions are illustrated by examples from the experience of countries with limited access orders and open access orders. Special attention is paid to transactions and interactions in modern Russia.