Pushkinskaya st. 43. office 10
Rostov-on-Don, Russia
344082
e-mail: info@hjournal.ru 
tel. +7(863) 269-88-14

cubsEN (2)

State Paternalism and Paternalist Fialure in the Theory of Patronised Goods

State Paternalism and Paternalist Fialure in the Theory of Patronised Goods

Journal of Institutional Studies, , Vol. 10 (no. 4),

The authors propose their view of the economic theory of modern state, being an important component of the theory of patronized goods and the general theory of mixed economy failures. Such an approach is based on the authors’ original understanding of irrationality, according to which individual behavior is considered irrational from the outside observer’s point of view, with his own preferences. The theoretical basis for this assumption is a known understanding of the social interest per se, without reducing it to the preferences of economic agents. This understanding provides more general definition to paternalism and find out the risks of its negative consequences. Analysis of state paternalism evolution, presented in the article, is important in the present research as it is reflected in the institute of state. Distinguished are several historic phases of change in its contents and trends of development. Presented the economic analysis of state-regulating models, models of social state, developing-state and «play-maker state», providing the institutions to create paternalist settings of the government, declaring its preferences as normative social interests. Alongside with the other failures of mixed economy the authors describe their special case – «paternalism failure», combining the failures of social choice and that of irrational bureaucratic activities. There are five types of government officers’ irrationality: Vjazemsky law, dilettantism, «teller effect», Parkinson law, and self-interest of bureaucrats generating «managerial failures». It is demonstrated that unlike the market failures and associated failures of government activities, the risks of paternalism failure of the government may be reduced by the institutes of the civic society and citizens’ self-organization due to their influence on creating the normative assumptions and limits to the bureaucratic tyranny.


Keywords: patronized goods; merit goods; market failures; paternalism; government failures; managerial failure; bureaucracy

References:
  • Arrow, K. (1972). Gifts and Exchanges. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1(4) (Summer), 343−362.
  • Boulding, K. (1968). Beyond Economics: Esayson Society, Religion, and Ethics.
  • Boulding, К. (1978). Ecodynamics: A New Theory of Societal Evolution.
  • Boudon, R. (1979). La logique du sociale: introduction a l’analyse sociologique. Paris: Hachette.
  • Brennan, G., Lomasky, L. (1983). Institutional Aspects of «Merit Goods» Analysis. Finanzarchiv, 41, 183−206.
  • Crozier, M. (1979). On ne change pas la société par décret. Paris: Fayard.
  • Grinberg, R., Rubinstein, A. (2005). Economic Sociodynamics. Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer-Verlag.
  • Harsanyi, J. C. (1982). Morality and the Theory of rational Behaviour. Utilitarianism and beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 39−62.
  • Krueger, A. (1990). Government Failures in Development. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4, 9−23.
  • Margolis, Н. (1982). Selfishness, Altruism and Rationality: A Theory of Social Choice. Cambridge.
  • Myrdal, G. (1956). The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory.
  • Musgrave, R. A. (1969). Provision for Social Goods. Public Economics. London − Basingstoke: MacMillan, 124−144.
  • Putnam, R. D. (1993). Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  • Rowley, C. K. (1997). Donald Wittman’s The myth of democratic failure. Public Choice, 92(1–2), 15–26.
  • Rowley, C. K., Vachris M. A. (1993). Snake oil economics versus public choice. In C. K. Rowley (ed.). Public Choice Theory, Volume III (pp. 573–584). Aldershot, UK and Brookfield, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
  • Rowley, C. K., Vachris M. A. (2004). Is democracy efficient? In C. K. Rowley, F. Schneider (eds.). The Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
  • Rubinstein, A. (2013). The theory of «patronized goods» in the optics of comparative methodology. International Journal of Entrepreneurial Knowledge, 1(1), 4−32.
  • Salamon, L. (1987). Partners in Public Service: The Scope and Theory of Government-Nonprofit Relations. The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook, edited by Walter W. Powell. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University, pp. 99−117.
  • Stigler, G. (1971). The Theory of Economic Regulation. Bell Journal of Economics, 2, 3−21.
  • Sunstein, C., Thaler R. (2003). Libertarian paternalism is not an oxymoron. University of Chicago Law Review, 70, 1159−1202.
  • Sunstein, C., Thaler, R. (2009). Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press.
  • Thaler, R. H., Shefrin, H. M. (1981). Control. Journal of Political Economy, 2, 392−406.
  • Tietzel, M., Muller, C. (1998). Noch mehr zur Meritorik. Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts − und Sozialwissenschaften. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
  • Tullock, G., Seldon, A., Brady, G. (2002). Government Failure: A Primer in Public Choice. Washington, DC: Cato Institute.
  • Winston, C. (2006). Government Failure versus Market Failure. Microeconomics Policy Research and Government Performance. Washington, DC: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies.
  • Alesina, A., Dzhuliano, P. (2016). Kultura i institutyi. Chast I // Voprosyi ekonomiki, 10, 82−111. (In Russian).
  • Avtonomov, V. S. (2014). Esche neskolko slov o metodologicheskom individualizme. Obschestvennyie nauki i sovremennost, 3, 53−56. (In Russian).
  • Balaczkij, E. V., Ekimova, N. A. (2015). Problema manipulirovaniya v sisteme RINCz. Vestnik UrFU. Seriya: E`konomika i uprav-lenie, 14(2), 166−178. (In Russian).
  • Beveridzh, U. G. (1944). E`konomicheskaya teoriya polnoj zanyatosti (The Economics of Full Employment). (In Russian).
  • Beveridzh, U. G. (1942). Social`noe straxovanie i drugie vidy` so-cial`nogo obsluzhivaniya (William Henry Beveridge. Social In-surance and Allied Services). (In Russian).
  • Blaug, M. (2004). Metodologiya ekonomicheskoy nauki, ili Kak ekonomistyi ob’yasnyayut. Per. s angl. Nauch. red. i vstup. st. V.S. Avtonomova. Moscow: NP Zhurnal Voprosyi ekonomiki. (In Russian).
  • Chesnokov, S. V. ( 2000). “Sotsiologiya gospodstva” Maksa Vebera skvoz prizmu teorii verhovnoy vlasti L.A. Tihomirova. Politicheskie issledovaniya, 2, 161−171. (In Russian).
  • Gorodeckij, A. E., Grinberg R. S., Voejkov M. I. (2018). Ehkonomicheskaya priroda gosudarstva: novyj rakurs: preprint. Moscow: IE RAN. 54 p. (In Russian).
  • Gorodetskiy, A. E., Rubinshteyn, A. Y. (2017). Nekotoryie aspektyi ekonomicheskoy teorii gosudarstva. Moscow: IE RAN, 59 p. (In Russian).
  • Gorodetskiy, А. Е. (2016). Gosudarstvennoe upravlenie I ekonomicheskaya bezopasnost. O disfunktsiyah gosudarstvennogo upravleniya. Audit I finansovyi analiz, 6, 426−437. (In Russian).
  • Grinberg, R. S., Rubinshteyn, A. Y. (2013). Individuum & gosudarstvo: ekonomicheskaya dilemma. Moscow: Ves mir. (In Russian).
  • Hillman, A. L. (2009). Gosudarstvo i ekonomicheskaya politika. Vozmozhnosti i ogranicheniya upravleniya. Moscow: GU VShE. (In Russian).
  • Igra v cyfir`, ili kak teper` ocenivayut trud uchenogo (sbornik statej o bibliometrike) (2011). Moscow: MCHNMO. (In Russian).
  • Kalabekov, I. G. (2007). Rossiyskie reformyi v tsifrah i faktah. Moscow: RUSAKI, p. 288. (In Russian).
  • Kapelyushnikov, R. I. (2013б). Povedencheskaya ekonomika i novyiy paternalizm. Voprosyi ekonomiki, 10, 28−46. (In Russian).
  • Kapelyushnikov, R. I. (2013a). Povedencheskaya ekonomika i novyiy paternalizm. Voprosyi ekonomiki, 9, 66−90. (In Russian).
  • Kovelman, A. B. (1996). Tolpa i mudretsyi talmuda. Moskva-Ierusalim Evreyskiy universitet v Moskve. (In Russian).
  • Laffon, Zh.-Zh. (2007). Stimulyi i politekonomiya. Moscow: GUVShE. (In Russian).
  • Melnik, D. V. (2015). Kontseptsiya sotsialnogo liberalizma na «ryinke idey» sovremennoy Rossii. Obschestvennyie nauki i sovremennost, 2, 43−53. (In Russian).
  • Mizes, L. fon. (2005). Chelovecheskaya deyatelnost: traktat po ekonomicheskoy teorii. Chelyabinsk: Sotsium. (In Russian).
  • Obolonskiy, A. V. (2000). Gosudarstvennaya sluzhba. Moscow: Delo. (In Russian).
  • Obolonskiy, A. V. (2011). Krizis byurokraticheskogo gosudarstva: reformyi gosudarstvennoy sluzhbyi: mezhdunarodnyiy opyit i rossiyskie realii. Moscow: Fond «Liberalnaya missiya». (In Russian).
  • Olson, M. (2006). Diktatura, demokratiya i razvitie. Teoriya i praktika demokratii, 375−382. (In Russian).
  • Parkinson, S. N. (1989). Zakonyi Parkinsona / Trans. N. Тrаubеrg. Moscow: Progress. (In Russian).
  • Polischuk, L. I. (2013). Autsorsing institutov. Voprosyi ekonomiki, 9, 40−65. (In Russian).
  • Polterovich, V. M. (2001). Transplantatsiya ekonomicheskih institutov // Ekonomicheskaya nauka sovremennoy Rossii, 3, 24–50. (In Russian).
  • Polterovich, V. M., Popov, V. V. (2007). Demokratizatsiya i ekonomicheskiy rost. Obschestvennyie nauki i sovremennost, 2, 13−27. (In Russian).
  • Public administration and economic security. About the dysfunction of state administration (2016). Audit and financial analysis, 6, 426−437. (In Russian).
  • Radyigin, A., Entov, R. (2012). «Provalyi gosudarstva»: teoriya i politika. Voprosyi ekonomiki, 12, 4−30. (In Russian).
  • Rubinshtein, A. Y. (2018a). Teoriya opekaemyh blag: uchebnik. SPb.: Aletejya, 304 p. (In Russian).
  • Rubinshtejn, A. Y. (2018b). Rossijskie e`konomicheskie zhurnaly`: tabel` o rangax. E`konomicheskaya nauka sovremennoj Rossii, 1, 108−130. (In Russian).
  • Rubinshtejn, A. Y., Sluczkin, L. N. (2018). «Multiway data analysis» i obshhaya zadacha ranzhirovaniya zhurnalov. Prikladnaya e`konometrika, 50, 90–113. (In Russian).
  • Rubinshteyn, A. Y. (2017). Elementyi obschey teorii iz’yanov smeshannoy ekonomiki. Voprosyi gosudarstvennogo i munitsipalnogo upravleniya, 1, 71−102. (In Russian).
  • Shipovalova, L. V. (2014). Indeks citirovaniya i ob``ektivnost` e`ks-pertov (popy`tka filosofstvovaniya na zlobu dnya). Vy`sshee obrazovanie v Rossii, 2, 119−125. (In Russian).
  • Shumpeter, Y. (2007). Teoriya ekonomicheskogo razvitiya. Kapitalizm, sotsializm i demokratiya. Moscow: Eksmo. (In Russian).
  • Smirnov, S. N. (2009). Rossiyskaya byurokratiya i ee rol v protsessah modernizatsii Rossii. Mir Rossii, 18(4), 115−139. (In Russian).
  • Tihonova, N. E. (2013). Sotsialnyiy liberalizm: est li alternativa? Obschestvennyie nauki i sovremennost, 2, 32−44. (In Russian).
  • Urnov, M. Yu. (2014). Rossiya: virtualnyie i realnyie politicheskie perspektivyi. Moscow: NIU VShE. (In Russian).
  • Vasilenko, I. A. (2001). Administrativno-gosudarstvennoe upravlenie v stranah zapada: SShA, Velikobritaniya, Frantsiya, Germaniya. Moscow: Logos. (In Russian).
  • Veber, M. (1994). Izbrannoe. Obraz obschestva. Moscow: Yurist. (In Russian).
  • Zinchenko, G. P. (2002). Gosudarstvennaya sluzhba: disfunktsii i deviatsii. Chinovnik, 17. (In Russian).
  • Zverev, A. F. (1992). Teoriya byurokratii: ot M. Vebera k L. fon Mizesu. Gosudarstvo i pravo, 1, 89−95. (In Russian).
Publisher: Ltd. "Humanitarian perspectives"
Founder: Ltd. "Humanitarian perspectives"
Online-ISSN: 2412-6039
ISSN: 2076-6297