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Power - property core of economic development: the cases of Russia and South Korea

Power - property core of economic development: the cases of Russia and South Korea

Вопросы регулирования экономики, , Том 3 (номер 4),
с. 98-108

В статье обосновывается тезис о том, что особенности национальных стратегий развития могут быть описаны и объяснены при помощи концепции власть - собственность, используемой в качестве дополнения в методологии исследования на базе концепций экономической свободы. При помощи кластерного анализа выявлены расхождения в стратегиях развития России и Южной Кореи. Авторы утверждают, что эти расхождения имеют характер институциональных и культурных атрибутов, соотносящихся с феноменом власти - собственности.


Ключевые слова: экономическое развитие; Россия; Южная Корея; власть - собственность

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Издатель: ООО "Гуманитарные Перспективы"
Учредитель: ООО "Гуманитарные Перспективы"
ISSN: 2078-5429