Pushkinskaya st. 43. office 10
Rostov-on-Don, Russia
344082
e-mail: info@hjournal.ru 
tel. +7(863) 269-88-14

cubsEN (2)

Evolutionary choice of institutional norms in the non-ergodic environment

Evolutionary choice of institutional norms in the non-ergodic environment

Journal of Institutional studies, , Vol. 6 (no.4),
p. 98-115

Paper discusses the evolutionary game theory applied to the analysis of the social interaction dynamics under presence of the arbitrary start dependence. General setup of the game model with n players and n strategies is presented. Differences between the best reply related adaptive mechanisms with alternative adaptive mechanisms, including the natural selection, are examined. When it comes to the incentives problem, there are set forth conditions under which the final convention depends on the initial strategy distribution. The number experiment results are presented. For the coordination problem, varieties of the initial conditions are presented that determine asymptotic game dynamics.


Keywords: evolutionary game theory; norms; non-ergodic systems

References:

  • Vasin A. A. (2009). Evolutionary game theory and economics. Part One. Optimality Principles and Models of Behavior Dynamics. Journal of the New Economic Association, no. 3, pp. 10-27. (In Russian).
  • Vasin A. A. (2010). Evolutionary game theory and economics. Part 2. Stability of Equilibria. Special Features of Human Behavior Evolution. Journal of the New Economic Association, no. 5, pp. 10-27. (In Russian).
  • Keynes J. M. (1993). General theory of employment, interest and money. Moscow, Anthology of Economic Classics. (In Russian). [Keynes J. M. (1936). General theory of employment, interest and money. London, Macmillan].
  • Machiavelli N. (1998a). The Prince // The Prince. Moscow, Eksmo-Press Publ. (In Russian). [Machiavelli N. (1961). The Prince. London, Penguin].
  • Machiavelli N. (1998b). Discourses on Livy // The Prince. Moscow, Eksmo-Press Publ. (In Russian). [Machiavelli N. (1987). Discourses on Livy. NY: Oxford University Press].
  • North D. (1997). Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. Moscow, Beginnings [Nachala] Publ. (In Russian). [North D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. NY, Cambridge University Press].
  • Polterovich V. M. (1999). Institutional traps and economic reforms. Economics and Mathematical Methods, no 1, pp. 1-37. (In Russian).
  • Rozmainsky I. V. (2010). Introduction to Post Keynesian economics. Ideas and Ideals [Idei i Idealy], no. 1, pp. 88-105. (In Russian).
  • Skorobogatov A. S. (2006a). Institutional economics. Saint-Petersburg, Publ. House of SU-HSE. (In Russian).
  • Skorobogatov A. S. (2006b). The institutions as the ordering factor and as the destabilizing force: New institutional and Post Keynesian perspectives. Voprosy Economiki, no. 8, pp. 102-118. (In Russian).
  • Skorobogatov A. S. (2006c). Stock market, the institutional structure and stability issue in the capitalist economy. Voprosy Economiki, no. 12, pp. 80-97. (In Russian).
  • Skorobogatov A. S. (2006d). A brief sketch on life and creative work of J. M. Keynes. Economic Herald of Rostov State University, no. 4, pp. 121-130. (In Russian).
  • Skorobogatov A. S. (2007). History as a subject-matter of economics. Economic Herald of Rostov State University, no. 3, pp. 69-84. (In Russian).
  • Skorobogatov A. S. (2011). Organizational foundations of the force inequality and power. Terra Economicus, no. 4, pp. 38-53. (In Russian).
  • Schumpeter J. A. (1995). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Moscow, Economics [Economika] Publ. (In Russian). [Schumpeter J. A. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London, Harper & Brothers].
  • Alchian A. A. (1950). Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory. Journal of Political Economy, no. 3, pp. 211-221.
  • Arthur W. B. (1989). Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events. Economic Journal, no. 1, pp. 116-131.
  • Brown G. W. (1951). Iterative Solutions of Games by Fictitious Play // Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation. T. C. Koopmans (ed.), New York, Wiley, pp. 374-376.
  • David P. A. (1985). Clio and the Economics of QWERTY. American Economic Review, no. 2, pp. 332-337.
  • Davidson P. (1996). Reality and Economic Theory. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, no. 4, pp. 479-508.
  • Foster D. P. and Young P. H. (1998). On the Nonconvergence of Fictitious Play in Coordination Games. Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 25, pp. 79-96.
  • Krugman P. R. (1991a). Increasing Returns and Economic Geography. Journal of Political Economy, no. 3, pp. 483-99.
  • Krugman P. R. (1991b). History versus Expectations. Quarterly Journal of Economics, no. 2, pp. 651-67.
  • Monderer D. and Shapley L. S. (1996). Potential Games. Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 14, pp. 124-143.
  • Vasin A. A. (1999а). On stability of mixed equilibria. Nonlinear Analysis, vol. 38, pp. 793-802
  • Vasin A. A. (1999b). The Folk theorem for dominance solutions. International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 28, pp. 15-24.
  • Young P. H. (1998). Individual Strategy and Social Structure. An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions. Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press.
  • Young P. H. (2014). The Evolution of Social Norms // University of Oxford Working Paper, no. 726.

Publisher: Ltd. "Humanitarian perspectives"
Founder: Southern Federal University
ISSN: 2076-6297