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The optimal institutional strategies and identity in uncertainty of social dilemmas: binary games

The optimal institutional strategies and identity in uncertainty of social dilemmas: binary games

Journal of Institutional studies, , Vol. 6 (no.4),
p. 116-136

In the paper the optimal institutional strategies of social agents in game uncertainty and in models of matching and marriage are analyzed. The author thinks that game theory analyzes “inner” rationality of individual interactions. Game theory aggregates a lot of social interactions to some choices and analyzes uncertainty of behavioral variants as understandable and stable pattern of regular interactions. The author comes to the conclusions that the institutional analysis of game situations is necessary for finding out key social and cognitive challenges with which social agents face in everyday life. The identity construction helps social agents to find solutions in social dilemmas. The analysis of game behavior should include studies of identity space.


Keywords: dilemmas of choice: uncertainty; social agents; game theory; institutional strategies; matching, marriage; identity; social dilemmas

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