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Institute of Professional Dynasties in the Context of Crony Capitalism

Institute of Professional Dynasties in the Context of Crony Capitalism

Journal of Institutional Studies, , Vol. 11 (no. 4),

Dynasties matter as a factor affecting social and economic development in various social orders. In the framework of this article, professional dynasties are considered as an institution that structures interactions associated with professional activities, the reproduction of human and social capital based on kinship, and group identity. The constructive or destructive influence of dynasties on social-economic development depends on the type of capitalism and its institutional structure. Social orders in this paper are considered through the prism of the natural state evolution concept. Among the forms of capitalism related to a natural state are considered: political, public, crony capitalism, and the economic order of modern mercantilism. Crony capitalism as a form of social order has developed due to the specific features of the institutional environment – a low intergroup trust level and trust in social institutions. Crony capitalism describes an economic system in which the government controls the economy with deformed market institutions, through support to different types of monopoly to provide the dominant groups with the institutional rent. In those conditions, the professional dynasties as a social institution implies activities of special interest groups which exist due to strong family ties and benefit from the institutional rent. The groups that make up professional dynasties, explicitly or implicitly, seek to create and maintain local professional and administrative monopolies. Constructive approach, in turn, treats professional dynasties as the channels to transfer and preserve the human capital in specific areas, related to culture and generation of the new knowledge, which do not imply significant institutional rent. Under Russian conditions, the problem of the institution dynasties acquires significance as a reflection of institutional inertia in the crony capitalism evolution, which ensures the stability and continuity between the elites.


Keywords: institutional economics; professional dynasties; natural state; crony capitalism; special interest groups; institutional rent

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