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Which Manufacturing Enterprises Have Received Advantages in Access to Government Orders After the Crisis of 2014–2015?

Which Manufacturing Enterprises Have Received Advantages in Access to Government Orders After the Crisis of 2014–2015?

Journal of Institutional Studies, , Vol. 13 (no. 1),

This paper, based on two surveys of manufacturing enterprises in 2014 and 2018, analyzed the characteristics of enterprises receiving public orders, as well as the dynamics of changes in access to public procurement after tightening external conditions for the Russian economy against the backdrop of international sanctions and the 2014–2015 crisis. The analysis showed that in 2016–2017 in the manufacturing industry, almost half (45%) of large and a third of medium-sized firms had public contracts. However, among the small firms that took part in the survey, only 22% received public contracts, despite the declared policy of supporting small businesses. In contrast to 2013, in the post-crisis period there were no significant differences in access to public procurement for enterprises with and without state participatio n. Along with this, the state began to impose more requirements on the disclosure of information on the structure of ownership by enterprises. Membership in business associations gave advantages in access to public procurement for medium and large enterprises, but this effect was absent for small firms. In general, against the background of international sanctions and the crisis of 2014–2015 for all types of enterprises in the post-crisis period, the scheme of complementarity of direct and indirect instruments of state support has been preserved, and for small enterprises, the manifestations of the "model of exchanges" between government and business have become more significant, thus small enterprises providing assistance to the regional and local authorities in the social development of the region, more often received public orders.


Keywords: public procurement; industrial enterprises; small business

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